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PRODUCING SPACE, PRODUCING CHINA: A CRITICAL 
INTERVENTION 
 
 
 
Abstract 
The concepts of the production and representation of space and place are receiving an 
increasing amount of attention in both the humanities and the social sciences. This paper will 
use the theoretical knowledge that has and continues to be produced on the subject to come 
to a better understanding of the spatial origins that constitute the place that is Chinese nation 
state. The analysis of spatial practises should shed light on the question what China is and 
wherefrom it receives the legitimacy for its social-spatial integrity. 
It will be argued that the arrival of modernity and its universal measurement of time and 
space were essential components in the gradual transformation from ethnocentric place to a 
territorially defined nation state. The political production and organisation of space employed 
for the formation of the nation state is argued to be the consequence of the same 
(globalising) logic that is now said to question and undermine its territorial integrity. 
Modernity and globalisation are in this paper, in other words, considered to be similar, if not 
identical, spatial-temporal concepts that both help to create and destruct places.  
This is arguably best visible in the constant production and reproduction of the most 
sophisticated of spatial organisations: our cities. I will argue that despite the changing face of 
cities, of which the disputed contemporary “globalisation” is but one of many, the spatial 
reality that is the modern nation state remains the same. This is not to return to an orthodox 
realist interpretation but to understand the very “stuff” that space and place are made of. 
 
Keywords: Globalisation, modernity, space, place, China 
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PRODUCING SPACE, PRODUCING CHINA: A CRITICAL 
INTERVENTION 
(Kindly do not quote or distribute without permission of the author)1 
INTRODUCTION 
When we think of China or Chinese (or any other “country” or citizenry for that matter), we 
tend to think about the territorial demarcated space that one recognises as the “country”, its 
“cities” or the “national culture” that flourishes “there”. It is difficult to avoid spatial metaphors 
such as these, which Lefebvre (1991) describes as the “representations of space”, to 
describe the identities of modern citizens. The significance of place and our relation to it 
goes however further back than the territorial creation of the nation state. The old Hebrew 
name for G-d2, HaMakom (literally “place”), is for instance testimony to the importance that 
the older, non-modern civilisations attached to the omnipotent nature of place3. We live, act 
and even experience our memories (Halbwachs 1980) in such “unmediated” places. This is 
what Lefebvre (1991) calls “representational space” or “lived (véçu) space” and resembles 
the kind of space described by Gaston Bachelard (1969) in his “poetics of space”. 
This archaic relationship between being and place, described by Heidegger (1996) as simply 
dasein (translated here as “being in place”), will form the basis for understanding how the 
production of “representations of space” (“conceived” (conçu) space) has led to the 
perceived (perçu) naturalness of the space that is the modern Chinese nation state4. I will, in 
other words, challenge the still very much accepted idea that perceived space (i.e. the effect 
                                                            
1 The author is a PhD candidate at the Department of Politics and international Studies, University of 
Warwick. Email: m.nieuwenhuis@warwick.ac.uk. 
This paper has been presented at the Graduate Student Summer Workshop: “East Asian Cities and 
Globalization, New Challenges, New Approaches” at the University of Warwick in July 2011. The 
author wishes to thank Dr. Iain Pirie (University of Warwick, PAIS) for his useful recommendations on 
an earlier draft of this paper. 
2 The full naming of a deity is circumvented in Jewish traditions to avoid the risk of defacing the deity’s 
omnipotence. 
3 See Casey (2009) for a more elaborate analysis on the origins and relevance to analysis of place of 
the word HaMakom. 
4 The triangular spatial relation which Lefebvre (1991) proposes contains three epistemological modes 
for analysing space. These modes also have an ontological counterpart. The lived space (or 
“representational space”) is in my understanding the space of Heidegger’s polis and is sometimes 
described by Lefebvre as the subjective or imaginary space. The second concept or mode of space 
(i.e. “representations of space”) is conceived mentally and contains a certain rationality or Cartesian 
logic that is visible in geometric cartography or modern urban planning. The third dimension or 
“perceived space” is the space that is taken for granted in the everydayness. “Each aspect of this 
three-part dialectic is in a relationship with the other two. Altogether they make up ‘space’” (Shields 
1998: 161). 
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of modern (re)production of space) is the silent or static product of the social modes of 
production. The questioning of what space is will start from a position in which this form of 
“rational” spatial planning and organisation is conceptualised as older than contemporary 
and conventional analyses of modernity seem to suggest. The “spatial reality”, which it 
shaped by this relation to place, is equipped to be more than the passive receiving product 
of social relations and therefore has a more vital role to play in the way we think about being 
in place. 
It will be argued that the spatial organisation of the city in 20th and 21th century China 
transcended a particular spatial logic which dates back to the earliest foundations of the 
Chinese nation state. The establishment of the national territorial place, which is the Chinese 
nation state, needs however to be historicised (and consequentially materialised) to 
understand how an abstractly conceived idea of space could gradually become synonymous 
to the perception of a very real China. The fact that the real is socially constructed should not 
deter us from understanding how and on what basis it was constructed historically. The 
question how contemporary globalisation has impacted China will be answered by looking 
somewhat more to the past rather than to the present. 
This paper will focus on the role of the production of space and the representation of place 
with reference to the creation and integral preservation of the Chinese nation state. The first 
section will provide a theoretical account of the notions of space and place. Here I will rely 
mainly on philosophical ideas proposed by Martin Heidegger (1996), Henri Lefebvre (1991; 
1996) and Edward Casey (1997; 2009). I will conceptualise globalisation as the pre-condition 
of modernity or what Heidegger describes as the defining characteristic of “the world as a 
picture” (Weltbild)5. In the second half of this section I wish to provide a very short historical 
background of the way in which being in place was considered before the arrival of a modern 
(and global) form of “spatial reality”. 
The second section will then employ these understandings to come to terms with the 
creation of the nation state during the Qing (1644-1911) period. I will mainly look at 
cartographic and architectural projects (i.e. presentations of space) of the Qing to defend the 
thesis that “China” was already long in the process of becoming modern (i.e. a nation state 
                                                            
5 Heidegger (1977: 91, 94, own translation, emphasis added) explains that “the fact that the world 
becomes picture at all is what distinguishes the essence of the modem age [der Neuzeit]… The word 
"picture" [Bild] now means the structured image [Gebild] that is the creature of man's producing which 
represents and sets before.... [Being in the world] is placed in the realm of man's knowing and of his 
having disposal, and that it is in being only in this way… Man becomes the representative [der 
Repräsentant] of that which is, in the sense of that which has the character of object” (see Heidegger 
and Grene 1976 for an alternative English translation and ; see Heidegger 1977 for the original text in 
German). 
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as we know China today) before its encounter with the “West” during the Macartney Mission 
(1793) and/or the Opium Wars (1839 to 1842, 1856 to 1860). The manner in which space 
was conceived at that time, in other words, created the condition for a new political 
organisation which was embedded in the integration of a new perception of space. 
The third section will then analyse how the productions and organisations of modern space 
during the Republican (1912-1949) and first People’s Republic of China (PRC) period (1949-
1978) were again employed by respectively the Guomindang (GMD) and the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) to forge a perceptual unitary legitimacy for political rule. The 
construction of modern cities played a fundamental role in this regard. Here space was 
conceived, along similar lines to the presentations of space in the previous period, to 
disseminate the perceived unitary space (territory) of the nation state. 
The fourth section will focus on the period after 1978 to describe how the entry of market 
forces has not so much radically altered as expanded the presentation of and logic 
underpinning modern urban place. This section poses the thesis that although post-
modernity as the product of a capitalist globalisation shapes and conceives space and time 
differently, the relationship between the modern being and the perceived place that is the 
nation state was in fact interdependent. The conclusion will then shortly summarise the main 
findings and will highlight some issues that might be worthy of further research on the topics 
discussed. 
THE POLITICS OF PLACE 
Repoliticising space 
The importance ascribed to the concept of place derives from its ability to connect space and 
time according to the logic of the social relations that it embeds. “We are in the lecture 
theatre”. The lecture theatre is the “place” “where” we are “now”; “yesterday” we were not 
“here”. The lecture theatre is thus the place where “time” and “space” come together (even if 
we are not “there”, we can remember the “place” in the “past” or dream about it in the 
“future”) 6 . The purpose of the lecture theatre as a “place” is however also socially 
constructed. It has a timeless form and specific function and without its socially accepted 
definition it would not be the “same place” (i.e. the lecture theatre). The lecture theatre also 
transforms the idea of who we are. We suddenly become students, teachers or simple 
                                                            
6 Harman argues in a different, Husserlian manner for a remaking of the Kantian object and the 
subject relation through an “intentional relation” which can be real “enough to call the relationship an 
object” (2010: 9). 
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visitors of an empty lecture theatre. The same can be said of the place that is the nation 
state (“territory”) which transforms humans into citizens of one state into citizens or strangers 
(e.g. tourists, expats etc) from another nation state place. The representations of space and 
time are in such an understanding socially constructed abstractions that are mediated and 
transcended through different places. 
Place and its relationship to being is therefore a universal concept which we can apply 
indiscriminately to all socially embedded situations (a word which at least in the English 
language has increasingly become temporal). The principle is that the relationship between 
being and place (literally “emplacement”) is mutually inclusive and automatically results in 
the construction of a spatially bounded history (Casey 1997). History is therefore as much a 
spatial as a temporal experience. Our relationship to a place is for that reason mutually 
reinforcing; without place we would not be and without being there in place, a place would 
not be (in neither time nor space). 
The city (as a place consisting of many other places) becomes then a “discourse and this 
discourse is truly a language: the city speaks to its inhabitants, we speak to our city, the 
where we are, simply by living in it, by wandering through it, by looking at it” (Barthes 1997: 
168). The modern production of urban space into a common place requires however a 
universally conceivable language for all beings to understand. This transfiguring process 
makes the production of space an inherently and inevitably political enterprise. 
The modern abstractions (e.g. nationality [“Chinese”], country [“China”], continental [“Asia”], 
city [“Beijing”], culture [“oriental”] etc) that we now uncritically employ in our everyday 
vocabularies bypass and undervalue the inherent politics and the history that is embedded in 
these geographical and often anthropological connotations. The focus is, to paraphrase 
Heidegger’s critique on Cartesian metaphysics, too much on “beings” rather than “Being” 
(dasein) (Heidegger 1996). The emphasis we give to the products of our modern spatial 
ontology (i.e. the modern triangulation of Lefebvre’s [1991] perceived, conceived and lived 
space) blurs the path to a common understanding of what it means to be in place. 
For the old Greeks the polis (πόλις) “was [instead] that which was absolutely worthy of 
question, and yet for the modern mind … the “political” is unquestioned: not in terms of its 
content, but in terms of its essence” (Elden 2000: 408; see also Elden 2001). The historical 
evolution of the production, representation and organisation of space become in such a 
mode of analysis, in other words, the preferred instrument for understanding the places 
(national territories, regions, cities etc) that are now seen as the unquestionable and taken 
for granted objects and consequences of the way we conceive and perceive space. The 
8 
 
deconstructing of space to a level of human “existence” allows us, in other words, to 
repoliticise all products and representations of space or as Elden writes “there is a politics of 
space because politics is spatial” (Elden 2000: 419, original emphasis). 
Being and place (in what was then not China) 
This is not to say that the earliest spatial structures found in China were similar to those we 
know to have existed in ancient Greece. Their spatial-political functioning does however 
show some interesting ontological similarities. Tu Cheng-Sheng (In Nienhauser 2006: 404, 
fn. 241) notes for, example, that citizens or guoren (translated as “people who dwelt within 
city walls”) in the Spring and Autumn period (770 to 476 BC) played, similar as in the Greek 
poleis, an important political role. Despite the fact that people never took collectively control 
of the government as was the case in the more direct democratic poleis. Rulers did however 
often promote public participation to secure a firmer grip on the territories they held and to 
more easily mobilise a populace in times of territorial expansion. The evolution of early city-
states also brought forth an increase in the number of public spaces (especially markets), 
which is a phenomenon often neglected in the literature on public participation in (ancient) 
China. Here (similarly as in the Greek agora) citizens were given the opportunity to 
assemble and exchange opinions on political events. 
The importance of disciplining the populace became, as a result of the creation of much 
vaster macro-states, in which cities were integrated, an increasingly urgent matter for the 
ruling political elites during the Warring States Period (475 to 221 BC)7. The new mode of 
governance, which was much less centralised around the political involvement of the citizens 
and much more focused on the administrative powers of a centralised bureaucracy, formed 
a radical departure in the way urban spaces were structured and organised (figure 1). While 
citizens and the nobles lived together in the old city states, new cities contained inner-walls 
out of which a social division between the nobility (士 or shi) and the citizenry emerged8. In 
                                                            
7 While cities in the Spring and Autumn Period had populaces of a few thousand, those of the Warring 
States Period inhabited tens of thousands of inhabitants. 
8 The importance of spatial demarcations has been one of the most striking differences between 
Western and Chinese cities. The following comes from a Chinese architecture entry in the 
Encyclopaedia Britannica “There is no real city in China without a surrounding wall, a condition which 
is indeed expressed by the fact that the Chinese used the same word cheng for a city and a city wall; 
there is no such thing as a city without a wall. It would be just as inconceivable as a house without a 
roof” (In Turnbull and Noon 2009: 5, original emphasis). 
The demarcated nature of the spatial organisation embodies the arrival of a new political-spatial 
reality which transformed the relation between being and place. While the earlier city characterised 
itself with the presence of a thick outer wall and a relatively unorganised inner city, the new city was 
an intensification of many different walls which transformed the city into a giant check board. Central 
to this new spatial organisation was the nobility and the administrative apparatus, which were 
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short, the city now came to be divided between an administrative part, a residential and a 
commercial part. The same sort of development, i.e. the portioning of space into function 
and social-economic specific social places, is also visible with in Greece with the arrival of 
the Hippodamian model of town planning (Burns 1976; Paden 2001). The changing physical 
contours of cities symbolised the onset of a new (urban) “spatial reality” in (what had yet to 
become) “China” and the “West”. This early modern historical development is felt until the 
present day. 
  
Abstract plan for ideal rulers city (Wangcheng) in 
Steinhardt (1990;  see also Zhang 2004). 
Rulers city (Wangcheng) in Steinhardt 
(1990, numbering added; , see also 
Zhang 2004). Legend: 1) markets, 2) 
private chambers, 3) Halls of Audience, 
4) Alters of Soil and Grain, 5) Ancestral 
temple. 
Figure 1: Visualisations of the early “ideal” city from the “Book of Diverse Crafts” (Kaogongji)9,10. 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
surrounded by a rigid system of residential wards (li), that were controlled by ward supervisors 
(lizheng). Yinong Xu informs us that “it is very possible that the urban residents were segregated in 
different wards by class and by profession” (2000: 69). 
9 The two-dimensional layout of the plans above does not adequately address the importance of the 
verticality of the actual built space. With the arrival of the new city, a whole new architecture came into 
existence which consisted of raised platforms (tai), pillar gates (que), towers (guan) and terrace 
pavilions (ge). All of these new forms were soon to cover the skies of the new urban landscape. The 
“politics of verticality”, a term which only recently was coined by the architect Eyal Weizman (2003), 
introduced “a [new form of] power based on visibility and vision” (Lewis 2006: 153). The visibility of 
the newly constructed towers however also meant that urban rulers increasingly decided to become 
less visible to the general population. They instead preferred to remain within the spatial confinements 
of their centrally located and vertically elevated places of residence. Their presence was however 
replaced by an always present political and vertical architecture. 
10 The kaogongji was composed during the Warring States period and became a complementary part 
of the Rites of Zhou (zhouli). The book provides building instructions for the perfect or ideal capital. 
The city that came closest to this ideal was Ming Beijing. For a reproduction of the original text (in 
Chinese) see Zhang (2004) and for contextual analysis see Steinhardt (1990)and Lewis (2006). An 
English translation is to my knowledge not yet available. 
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Throughout the whole of the dynastic period, Chinese rulers time and again employed 
similar spatial (re)organisations to serve their political needs. The production of space 
helped legitimise those in power to stay in power. The state’s monopoly on the production 
and organisation of space was however never one-directional since other agencies 
continuously challenged the existing organisation and reality of space. The place of the 
market for instance had already been contested in times of the Warring States and ultimately 
forced cities to expand into rural areas during the Song dynasty. The conclusion one could 
draw is that the tensions existent within society was (and continues to be) played out through 
the medium of the production of space which transforms itself according to the unfolding of 
the struggle that underpins its social reality. It was only with the arrival of a universalising 
modernity (and the nation state) during the Qing period that this struggle over the production 
of space temporarily came to be resolved. 
MODERNITY AND THE CHANGE THAT IT BROUGHT TO THE MEANING OF PLACE 
AND BEING 
The connection between the arrival of modernity and the production of political space(s) is 
founded on the universalising of time and space. The transition towards the creation of the 
modern nation state, a spatio-political development which is much more problematic than is 
often assumed, has considerably accelerated the pace in which space was transformed 
homogeneously, time successively and place abstractly. To understand how this happened 
and continues to happen it is worth considering how the “spatial reality” that is so deeply 
rooted in the (abstract) modern nation state came to inform and reshape “being in place”. 
The nation state is probably the single institution that most perfectly embodies the impact 
that the new, modern conceptualisation of time and space had on what was to become 
society or the “imagined community” (Anderson 2006). Strangers and subjects became 
“citizens” in this new abstract spatial territory that enforced and adhered to a mode of 
legitimacy that gradually came to be firmly rooted in the consciousness and organisation of 
society. The importance of this abstract unity in service of the nation state is however also 
mediated through the visualisation of a spatially and historically common place in 
architecture, cartography and later in city planning. 
Before the onset of modernity, social belonging to the Chinese Empire and civilisation was 
ethnocentrically defined on the basis of physical composition or cultural disposition (Dikötter 
1994). The ethnographic hierarchical nature of space in the term “middle kingdom” (or 
“central kingdom” as others prefer to call it) finds its historical correspondences, for example, 
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in the aforementioned urban planning and in the cartographic representations of a central 
place in the world (figure 2). 
 
Figure 2: The five dependencies in the Yu Gong (a chapter in the Shujing) in Needham (1995). 
The concentric rings, which radiate outwards away from the inner imperial rectangular 
domain, organise space in a pre-modern ethnographic manner. The centrality of the imperial 
centre, which carries extra political weight due to its self-proclaimed relationship with heaven 
(tianxia), legitimises itself as being at the centre of the (square) earth and therefore humanity 
(see for more Tuan 1990; Dikötter 1994; Needham 1995). The privileging of a certain 
political place through its centralisation in space is however not something uniquely Chinese, 
but can also be found in late medieval European cartographic representations that in a 
similar fashion placed the Holy Land (and later Rome) at their centre of both the world and 
civilisation. Other examples include, but are not limited to, Greenland’s Inuits who thought of 
their place as the centre of the world and human civilisation, Mongols who thought they lived 
on the world’s mound and Indocentrism which argued for Indian centrality in both 
geographical and historical terms (Tuan 1990). The question is perhaps not so much who is 
or who is not spatially centric but how that ontological relationship between place and being 
came to be depoliticised in the universalising spatial principles that came to shape the 
abstract place of the nation-state. 
The idea of ethnocentrism started gradually to change in China (among other “countries”) 
with the arrival of a new way of thinking about territory (as a spatial political technology). A 
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characteristic example of the spatial-ethnic revision of what it meant to talk of China is visible 
in the Qianlong Emperor’s 1775 pronouncement on the unity of China. 
“There exists a view of China (Zhongxia), according to which non-Han people cannot become China’s 
subject and their land cannot be integrated into the territory of China. This does not represent our 
dynasty’s understanding of China, but is instead that of the earlier Han, Tang, Song, and Ming 
dynasties”(Zhao 2006: 4, original emphasis). 
The transformation from an ethnically defined China to a territorial abstract unity symbolised 
a transformation in what “China” was and what it meant to be “Chinese”. The Qing 
successfully managed to subordinate their ethnic origins and similarly as in the case of other 
contemporaneous empires (e.g. Ottomans) came to identify their ethnic origins with that of 
the nation-state. This became visible in their interaction with other empires, for example in 
the Sino-Russian Nerchinsk Treaty of 1689. The text, originally drafted by Jesuits in Latin, 
links the name of the Qing Empire in both the Manchu and the Chinese language with the 
term “China” (Chinese: shu zhongguo, Manchu: dulimbai gurun) (Zhao 2006). 
The production of space into a distinct territory also became represented in maps which 
adhered to the same universalising principles of modernity. The spatial representation in 
cartographic maps are known to both mask differences in the organisation, use and 
production of space and to forge imagined unities that serve the basis for state legitimacy 
and state formation. “Cartography did not invent territory but it changed the ways of 
producing territory, and in that respect cartography conditioned and facilitated the formation 
of states, empires and a global space during the early modern era” (Strandsbjerg 2010: 15). 
Maps are (what Foucault would have called) “technologies of knowledge” and more often 
exclude things than they include. The incorporation of geometric knowledge on measures of 
longitude and latitude in maps, which occurred first during the late Ming but only became 
politically relevant during the Qing, was employed as a technical means to territorialise 
China and bring about a gradual transformation from an ethnocentric state to a modern 
territorialised nation-state. It bears mentioning however that the idea of “centrality” was 
similar to the European context not abandoned. The location of Beijing in fact remained in all 
sequential state approved atlases (that I have seen) the prime meridian until as late as the 
1930s. 
13 
 
 
Figure 3: Kangxi huangyu quanlan tu (Atlas of the Empire of the Kangxi Era) (1943[1721])11. (Library 
of congress (G7820.L8) in Li Xiaocong (2004: 12-13), see also Li Xiaocong (1996: 160-167) for 
locations in Europe of other versions and Walter Fuchs (1943) for useful reproductions of the original 
maps. Finally, see British Library for Matteo Ripa’s version of 1719 (location: Maps 37.e.28)12. 
The accurate mapping and representation of territories and borders in the Kangxi huangyu 
quanlan tu (figure 3) served the purpose to protect the state’s interests against the threats 
that existed in its interior (Mongolia and Tibet) and its exterior (Russia and possibly beyond), 
                                                            
11 The map combined newly gathered surveying data and existing information from the 32 provincial 
and regional maps that were collected by Jesuit Pierre Jartoux. Régis, Jartoux and Fridelli were 
sequentially responsible for sending the map to France and for disseminating the new geographical 
knowledge to Europe. The map was later (1735) reproduced by Duhalde in his “Description 
geographique, historique, chronologique, politique, et physique de l'empire de la Chine et de la 
Tartarie chinoise” which in turn was (1738) translated into English under the title “A Description of the 
Empire ofChina and Chinese-Tartary, Together with the Kingdoms of Korea, and Tibet” (Yee 1994). 
The map was written in Chinese for interior places and in Manchu for exterior space. Matteo Ripa 
later onwards annotated the map in Italian (see BL Maps K.Top.116.15, 15a, 15b). Ripa’s map was 
similarly, to the one produced for the Kangxi emperor, drawn to a scale of 1:1,400,000. 
12 Matteo Ripa’s 1719 spectacular map, based on the original Huangyu quanlan tu, was presented to 
George I (Gray 1960) and its beautifully illustrated three rolls can now be found at the British Library 
(Maps K.Top.116.15, 15a, 15b). 
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while simultaneously helping to construct the myth of a unified national identity (or 
“civilisation”). These two objectives do not mutually exclude each other, but are instead 
interdependent and mutually reinforcing. The expansion and consolidation of territory was 
during the Qing inseparable from the more global context at that time13. Millward notes for 
example that “Qing expansion to the northwest parallels European state-building and 
expansionism in its concern with measurement and the “scientific” gathering of geographic 
and ethnographic data to undergird national and imperial control” (1999: 76). Similar 
conclusions can be drawn from the Qing’s ethnographic records (Hostetler 2001; compare 
with Teng 2004) and its militarisation projects (Waley-Cohen 2006; see also the edited 
volume of Di Cosmo 2009) which are in the literature both employed to illustrate the nation 
state enterprise14. 
The gradual territorial and multi-ethnic nation-state also displayed its unity architecturally in 
both the yuanming yuan and the Qing Summer Palace. The yuanming yuan, which served 
besides its function as the favourite residence of the Qianlong emperor also as a 
manufacturing site for clock and glassmaking in the 18th century, represented an important 
spatial metaphor for Qing universal imperialism. The gardens hosted numerous 
reproductions of famous buildings from across the country and were additionally home to 
several European inspired rococo baroque and renaissance palatial buildings (xiyang lou). 
Elman describes the complex as being representative of an “eclectic architectural style that 
the Manchu court favored as part of their efforts to create a universal vision of their power in 
Asia and beyond” (2009: 74, 75). Waley-Cohen similarly described the gardens as “a kind of 
theme park of possession or domination” (2006: 127, fn. 6) and raises the question as to 
what the extent bourbon Versailles might have influenced the construction of the gardens. 
The gardens were, in other words, constructed to represent and symbolise the unity and 
widespread influence of the Qing Empire in a miniature form. 
The reproduction of buildings and architectural styles was not limited to the yuanming yuan 
alone, but is also characteristic of the Qing Summer Palace (bishu shanzhuang) in Chengde. 
Here several southern influenced pagodas and numerous Tibetan Buddhist temples and 
                                                            
13 The importance that the Qianlong emperor attached to more detailed knowledge is also observed 
by Lauren Newby who writes that the Qianlong emperor was “personally concerned by the dearth of 
geographical knowledge of the region and laid particular stress on the need to correct inaccuracies 
and standardize the transliteration of proper names” (1996: 68). The fact that special emphasis was 
paid to transliteration by the Qianlong is also visible in the Unified Language Gazetteer of the Western 
Regions (Xiyu tongwen zhi) which “was intended to standardize Chinese and Manchu transcriptions 
of Mongolian, Zunghar, Eastern Turki (Uyghur), and Tibetan names as an aid to the compilation of the 
Huangyu Xiyu tuzhi, and the Pingding Zhunga’er fanglue (Imperially commissioned military history of 
the pacification of the Zunghars)”(Millward 1999: 74, 75). 
14 See also Perdue’s (2005) impressive work on this subject. 
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even regional landscapes were constructed15, most of which were directly influenced by 
places from across the newly conquered territories, to display the legitimacy and territorial 
grandeur of the imperial Qing. The choice for the location of Chengde, on the northern 
fringes (and thus outside the Great Wall) of the Qing Empire (bordering Manchuria and 
Mongolia), was similarly a carefully weighted political decision and posed a radical break 
from earlier Chinese traditions that had placed capitals in more centrally located sites16. 
Forêt explains the decision as being an integral part of the “urban fulfilment of the “Great 
Enterprise” that aimed at establishing the legitimacy of Manchu power in East and Central 
Asia” (1995: 327; 2000: 18). It is no wonder then that the politics underlying the construction 
of such sites is comparable and even historically interconnected to that of the palaces of 
Versailles in France17. 
The deconstruction and detaching of modern China from older theoretical and historical 
paradigms opens the path to generalise modernity on the basis of a shifting reorientation in 
the representation, production and experience of place. The standardisation of territorial 
space and the production of abstract geographic imaginations, which came to constitute the 
place of the nation state, are the defining characteristics of a modernity that produces 
uniform spaces rather than being the geographical product of them. To consider the Chinese 
nation state not modern is besides missing the point, a contradiction in terms. Contemporary 
China is by its very construct a modern place that finds it origins in the homogenising 
principles of time and space. 
                                                            
15 The Puning Si temple was for example modelled after the bSam-yas (Samyé) Temple in Tibet, the 
Putuo Zongcheng Miao was reproduced after the original Potala Palace in Lhasa and the architecture 
of the Anyuan (or Ili) Temple is believed to have been based on the Guerzha Temple in Xinjiang. The 
tall Jinshan ting (or Shangdi ge) Pagoda was based on the Jinshan temple in Zhenjiang and the Sheli 
pagoda finds its origins in the Bao’en monastery in Nanjing and the Liuhe pagoda in southern 
Hangzhou. The attention given to Chengde in historical analyses of early modern China is strangely 
enough still very limited. For a well written analysis of the architectural works, the origins and their 
relevance for the Qing imperial project, please see Philippe Forêt’s Mapping Chengde: The Qing 
Landscape Enterprise (2000). 
16 Forêt (2000) argues that the site served as the third capital (in addition to Beijing and Mukden) for 
the Manchu Qing. 
17 The two courts are known to have substantially exchanged their respective cultures. The 
introduction of Chinoiserie architecture in Versailles dates back to the “Trianon de Porcelaine” in 1670. 
The building, located in the park at Versailles, was is in fact the first known piece of Chinoiserie 
architecture in Europe (see Thomas 2009, also for an excellent comperative study between Versailles 
and the Yuanming Yuan). The Qianlong Emperor’s fascination with the European arts was, in turn, 
visualised by the 16 large scale battle paintings (8 meters wide and 4 meters high) of his military 
campaigns in Xinjiang which he commissioned to the Jesuits Sallusti, Attiret, Sichelbarth and the 
famous Italian court painter Giuseppe Castiglione (see Sullivan 1989, especially: 67-77; and Szrajber 
2006). The paintings were later, on request by the Chinese emperor, sent to for production in France. 
Waley-Cohen notes that an important reason for sending the paintings to France was the Qianlong’s 
wish “to make his own military might known in those quarters” (2006: 41). 
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The careful integration of territories into a constructed unified whole anticipated the arrival 
and gradual dissemination of a national awareness that makes the experience in China little 
different than the modernisation enterprise and experience in other “countries”. The 
universalising process that brought with it the legitimacy of the nation state was global in its 
distribution of the logic and measurement of time and space. The space that globalisation is 
made out of can therefore not be different than then place which the nation state is. This 
means, in other words, that globalisation and the nation state are not and cannot be spatial 
opposites but are in fact the logical and direct result of the way we think of and have used 
space. 
The next section will show how the continuity and expansion in the representation and 
production of a modern conceptualisation of space helped to forge a link between the 20th 
century political ideologies (of the CCP and the GMD) and the built environment and 
imagined unity of the nation state. The centrality of China as a place is in this project of 
identity formation inescapably linked to the production and ultimately the representation of 
especially urban space. What is necessary therefore is an understanding of how spatial 
(re)arrangements evolved after the coming to power of first the GMD and then the CCP. The 
representation and production of space came to infiltrate and inform people’s urban 
everydayness. The social relationship to place became as a result of the increasingly 
organised state gradually more politicised, while their sense of belonging to the nation state 
was gradually naturalised. This process of “subjectification” (or perhaps rather 
“interpellation”) was again much more geographically and conceptually global than is often 
assumed. 
THE PRODUCTION OF THE CITY FOR THE NEW NATION STATE 
The integration of modernity, i.e. reconfiguring space and time to a universal logic, into the 
everydayness is arguably most felt in the city. The idea of equalising modernity with the city 
is at least as old as Goethe’s Faust and has consequentially been one of the cornerstones 
for the Great Modernists (Marx, Weber etc) to come to terms with modernity. The need to 
arrange the city on the basis of the universal logic of modernity is (dependent on whom one 
reads) driven by the sheer number of people that either visit or live there and/or by the 
capital and resources that reside there. 
Rationalising the city in spatial terms through the creation and widening of roads, sewage 
systems, modern housing (etc) brings order to an otherwise chaotic whole. The person that 
is “lost” (an inherently spatial term) in an unknown city is likely to ask for “directions” (spatial) 
and for the duration (temporal) to get from point A to point B. This is done preferably by 
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someone that has more “knowledge” about the spatial structure of the city. That knowledge 
can however only be transferred in a common medium which is understood by both the 
receiver and supplier of the information. The city as such becomes an abstract text (or meta-
language) which is ready for anyone to be read, even though not everybody might be 
familiar with the sheer number of places that compose the city. 
The latter suggests that the phenomenological aspect of the city (the relationship between 
being and place) remains untouched and is thus open for subjective appropriation. The role 
of the architectural planner, the “human image of God the Creator” (Lefebvre 1996: 98), is 
therefore focused on normalising and neutralising places through their integration into a 
monotonous and rational form of space. 
GMD 
The idea of modern urban planning (or the rational organising of space) was in China first 
introduced during the GMD period. The city of Nanjing was imagined to become a symbol of 
a new China (xin zhongguo). Sun Yat-sen imagined the new capital to “become an exemplar 
for the modern China to come, combing modern technology and materials with the best of 
Chinese architecture and aesthetics… The new capital of China, would hearken back to the 
“time of her greatest past glory”, instilling patriotism in the hearts of all Chinese people” 
(Musgrove 2000: 139). The fact that the modern production of space in Nanjing was used 
here to “return” to another (the thus far greatest) place in the past does not only refer to a 
legitimisation process undertaken by the state but also retrospectively rationalises the spatial 
unity of the older spatial project. This reinterpretation of a place, which was not modern 
before the Qing, signals the authority and abstract unity of modernity with its totalising 
attitude towards the representation of both geography and history. The importance of an 
imagined united national past in the architecture of the built environment was, in other 
words, not downplayed but fully exploited and integrated to further boost the legitimacy of 
the ruling GMD (see figures 4 to 6). 
The rationale for this integration, which leads to a historical harmonisation of time and space, 
is the formation of the abstract unity of the nation state. The relationship between a revision 
of history on the one hand and the necessity of “newness” (or the breaking with history) on 
the other, brings forth a contradictory and potentially volatile situation. The renewal in the 
organisation and production of space is however also a necessary requirement if a 
systematic change in the relationship between being and place is to be accomplished 
(Lefebvre 1991).  
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Nanjing’s reconstruction was, similarly to contemporaneous cities such as Ankara, Brasilia 
and New Deli, used as exemplary of the government’s adaptation of a “Haussmannian” form 
of modernity. Lipkin (2006) and Kirby (2000) show how this spatial reorganisation of space 
(through the creation of broad boulevards, sewer systems, urban zoning and the reallocation 
of thousands of people) symbolised a vast plan for the remodelling and engineering a “new 
Chinese society”18. 
The leadership of the GMD in the creation of a new Chinese citizenship (based on the 
principle of yidang zhiguo or “govern the state through the party”) was given a central role in 
this transformation. This was spatially translated in the different competing urban plans 
which all emphasised the spatial-political role of the GMD government in the construction of 
what was described by the New York Times as the “Capitol Hill of China” (Misselwitz 1929: 
XX11). The new administrative area was meant to provide the GMD Central Party Office’ a 
place (see figure 7) that would help position it “as the dominant element, uniting all under its 
gaze” (Musgrove 2000: 139). 
 
Figure 4: “The National Government Center” proposed by Henry K.Murphy was comprised of “three 
groups of buildings, one for the Guomindang’s congressional offices, a government house for China’s 
head of state, and a “Five Houses (Yuan) and Ministries Group” for the executive branch” (Murphy 
[1929] in Cody 1996: 360). 
                                                            
18 To indicate the grandness of the project Ernest P. Goodrich, an American civil engineer involved in 
the Nanjing project, was reported as saying that “the plans call for more than 350 miles of streets and 
boulevards as well as modern government and capitol buildings, a grand central railway station, 
municipal government structures and other improvements... The cost will run into millions of dollars” 
(Goodrich in The New York Times 1929: 6). 
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Figure 5: Close-up of “the Layout of the ten Ministry Buildings, the Ten Yuans [sic], and the 
Government House”(Murphy in Misselwitz 1929). Visible in these buildings is the importance that was 
devoted to the creation and incorporation of what has been labelled as a “Chinese Renaissance” 
style. 
 
Figure 6: The plan for the administrative district was later further extended to the South (Murphy 
[1929] in 1996: 361). 
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Figure 7: The first (and according to Musgrove [2000] the most favoured plan) for Nanjing’s central 
administrative area. The Central Party Headquarters in at the top and the proposed airport at the 
bottom (from Rowe and Kuan 2002).  
The fact that Nanjing plans was not fully implemented (mainly due to a lack of funds and to 
the political upheavals that took place in the 1930s) does not corrode the realities of the 
underlying political motives that were formed by and brought about such (re)organisations 
and (re)productions of space 19 . The search for factors that could help legitimise the 
existence of the nation state lies in fact central to all such spatial strategies. The 
formalisation and normalisation embedded in projects as in those described above 
subordinate the diversity of earlier representations into depoliticised and natural looking 
wholes. This endemic need to create “a homogenous environment, a totally modernised 
                                                            
19 The concurrent Greater Shanghai Plan of the 1920s (see MacPherson 1990; MacPherson 1996) 
was similarly left largely unfinished. Immediately after the Second Sino-Japanese War, the Shanghai 
municipal government pushed for a remodelled urban Master Plan that was meant to “be 
implemented in successive stages over a 25-year period, with a 50-year planning of the entire region 
as the final goal” (MacPherson 1996: 512). Lu notes that while the old Shanghai plan primarily 
“emphasized the Beaux-Arts concern for formal grandeur, the new plan stressed universalistic 
standards of functionality and efficiency” (Lu 2006a: 27; Lu 2006b: 375). The Master Plan was until 
the very arrival of the first detachments of the People’s Liberation Army in the city in May 1949 still 
being adjusted by local authorities and urban planning specialists. Soon thereafter however, the city’s 
grand plans were sacrificed to serve the purpose of creating a socialist city. 
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space” (Berman 1983: 68), was in fact not merely an imported product of 20th century China, 
but the product of a long process of nation state formation that had commenced some 300 
years earlier. 
CCP 
The importance that was given to the production of space in the city during the first 
instalment of the CCP government (1949-1978) was illustrated by the Party’s emphasis on 
the built environment. The research (see for examples Bray 2005; Lu 2006a) on work units 
(danwei) and urban communes, which literally came to dominate both the cityscape and the 
relationship of between being and place, is far too vast to do justice in the short remainder of 
this paper. The reorganisation of urban space was however of such a degree that the very 
idea of “the city” came to be challenged.  
There has been a long debate (see Salaff 1967; Ma 1976; Meisner 1982; Ma 2002) on the 
question whether the CCP was in fact “anti-urban” and “pro-rural” or “pro-urban” and 
exploitative of the potential economic vitality that resided in the city. The relationship 
between the production of space and the effect it has on the being-in-place has in many of 
such analyses been overlooked and instead been replaced by the idea that the organic 
whole of the city is a given. I believe it to be more fruitful to bring space back to life and 
analyse how the defragmentation of the taken for granted concept of “the city” and the 
sequential moulding of the relationship between social relations and urban places led to the 
political legitimisation of the Party and the bigger place that is the nation state. 
In such an analysis we would discover how the organisation in units and communes formed 
self-sufficient social-spatial entities (see figure 8), which perhaps might have harmed and 
defragmented the spatial integrity of the city, but also helped to collectively give form and 
content to the new ideological unity and legitimacy of the socialist state20. The socialist 
production of space did as such not abandon the geometric project which the Qing had 
started some 300 years earlier, but built upon the scientific knowledge and rationality of 
modernity to create its own urban utopia. The creation of a socialist utopia was at the very 
core of the relationship between being and place. The new spatial rearrangement was not 
only employed to combine work with dwelling but reshaped the meaning of what it meant “to 
be in place”. The work unit”, Lu and Perry note, “was once so essential to daily life in urban 
China that people would say one could be without a job, but not without a danwei” (1997: 3). 
                                                            
20 This argument falls largely in line with what Perry (2007) calls a “strategy of divide-and-conquer” in 
which urban society is fragmented and subjective consciousness is converted to serve the national 
interest of the socialist state (cf. Bray 1997). 
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Figure 8: Hongshun Li People’s Commune (in Tianjin) layout21. The urban commune was built in the 
period 1958-1962 and covered an area of 16,000 square meters (37 percent of which had a 
residential purpose). Legend: 1) danyuan, 2) communal dining hall and kitchen, 3) shop, 4) bank, 5) 
bathrooms (female), 6) bathrooms (male), 7) toilets, 8) laundry rooms, 9) lobby and reception, 10) 
day-care facilities (plan from Huang [1958] 1983, numbering added). 
The urge to reorganise space in the city was also at the heart for the destruction of much of 
the imperial city of Beijing. The fact that the CCP chose Beijing over Shanghai, Nanjing or 
Chongqing as the capital of a new China is symbolic for the difficult relationship between the 
desire for the new (place) and the authority that resides in the (places of) the old. This led 
also to the difficult decision that the CCP had to undertake with regards to the built 
environment of the old imperial centre. The need to preserve the heart of what had become 
synonymous to (but initially had not been) China, i.e. Ming China22, ran counter to the Party’s 
new imagined representation of the China that should be. 
An inevitable struggle arouse between those that wished to preserve the city (led by the 
“father of modern China architecture” Liang Sicheng and the urban planner Chen Zhangxin) 
and those that wished to destruct and rebuild the old centre of Beijing (headed by the Soviet 
planner M.G. Barannikov and the Chinese planners Zhao Dongri and Zhu Zhaoxue). 
                                                            
21 According to the local authorities, Liu Shaoqi visited the Hongshun Li in 1959 which inspired him to 
consider the famous urban communes of the early 1960s 
(http://www.hw01.com/316/561/20080610134150.htm [in Chinese]). 
22 The Forbidden City was founded and transformed into the empire’s capital city in the Ming dynasty 
during the rule of Yongle Emperor. 
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Chairman Mao’s personal involvement23 in favouring the plan proposed by the latter group 
which wanted to locate the new government of the PRC inside Beijing’s old imperial quarters 
is both symbolic for the importance of spatial and historical centrality and for the “creative 
destruction” that is necessary to legitimise the arrival of a new state and ideology24. 
At the heart of the organisation, production and representation of space resides the dialectic 
relationship between being and place. The moulding that takes place, as a result of the 
social relations that constitute and vitalise the abstract unity of the nation state, reconfigures 
the relationship between being and place. The role of the planner is not that of the neutral 
architect of space but of the politicised mediator that transcends and reproduces an 
organisation of space which legitimises and empowers the nation state. This modern logic 
applies as much to the city of Mao as it does to that of Deng. 
BEING IN THE MARKET PLACE 
The shape and function of the city has since the reforms (gaige kaifang) in 1978 been 
reinvented to serve a different political purpose. The use of space has shifted from a 
centrally state led apparatus with a clear focus on socialist modes of production to a more 
decentralised system in which decisions are increasingly made on a basis of market 
interests. The re-direction towards a decentralised state-led capitalism marks both a radical 
shift in the use of space and the shape of place, but also shows significant continuities in the 
role of the state and the influence it has on the production and organisation of urban space. 
The purpose of the previous discussed work units has for example significantly been 
reformed. The formerly spatially demarcated units are spatially made more accessible and 
increasingly cater welfare and community oriented functions instead of political and 
productive purposes. The Chinese cities in the aftermath have as a result of this “spatial 
opening-up” grown into more “organic” looking wholes. 
                                                            
23 It is somewhat unclear how much Mao was involved in the favouring of the so-called “Zhao-Zhu 
Plan”. Wu follows Wang Jun in arguing that “Mao Zedong personally decided to locate the 
government in the old city” (2005: 8) and Chang-tai Hung relies on a speech given by P.V. Abramov 
(vice mayor of Moscow) which “revealed that Peng Zhen [Mayor of Beijing] has told Soviet Advisors 
that the mayor had “consulted with Chairman Mao [on the issue], and that the chairman maintained 
that [key] government offices had to be set up inside the city, whereas offices of lesser importance 
could be located in the new district”” (2010: 31). 
24 There were however also more pragmatic reasons to favour the old imperial centre as the new CCP 
headquarters. The so-called “Liang-Chen plan” was based on the construction of a new city, west of 
the imperial city, which would have required a significant amount of investment that the new state 
could hardly afford. The rebuilding of the old city was also necessary considering the deplorable 
condition of much of its houses. Finally, the idea and importance attached to the practise of 
conservation was a relatively unknown phenomenon at that time in China (see Wu 1999). 
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The 1988 legislation for land use rights and the 1989 City Planning Act (CPA)25 helped cities 
in their transformation from anonymous production centres to vibrant centres of 
accumulation and consumption. This does not mean however, that the state has dissolved or 
disappeared from the practise of spatial planning, but rather that the state has shifted its 
focus and now serves very different priorities than the ones it had in the previous period. The 
political system has entered a phase of fiscal and administrative decentralisation in which 
local governments are granted more independence in the allocation and organisation of 
space within their municipalities. An important example of this spatial decentralisation is the 
commodification of land, which previously was considered to be a public good provided by 
the state for production motives, but is now marketised as one of the country’s most valuable 
economic assets. 
Ruan describes how in Shanghai the growth of high-rise buildings with more than 18 storeys 
has increased to 2800 with “approximately 2000 more towers about to go up” (in Smith 2008: 
266). Shenjing He (2007) adds that the city now counts well over 4,000 km2 of villas and 
luxury apartments, a number which is 5.5 times greater than that of 1995. Ma and Bao note 
that according to the Chinese Ministry of Construction “30 billion m2 of new buildings will be 
built [in China] between 2005 and 2020, accounting for half of the world’s new construction 
during this period (in Yang and Kohler 2008: 2)26. There is little if any disagreement over the 
economic importance of the city for the legitimacy of the state. 
The spatial creative destruction, which now transforms China’s urban landscape, is 
intrinsically linked to the arrival of a new ideology. The need for a “new” city, which at times 
fundamentally breaks with the preceding one(s) and at other moments silently copies 
reminiscences of its past (figure 9), marks the arrival of as much a new social-economic 
system as a new relationship to place. The immediate question to which China we are 
looking is at the basis on the way we interact with place and how this relationship has 
historically been constructed. The production of space and the manner in which we perceive 
it is neither geographically or temporally static nor deterministically socially constructed, but 
plays a role on its own in constructing a “spatial reality”. This is perhaps nowhere as visible 
                                                            
25 These regulations allowed municipal governments to both sell and buy land use rights to private 
developers. The 1988 Land Administration Law allowed the private leasing of land (i.e. the legal 
transference of land use rights) whereas the 1989 City Planning Act placed land control under the 
direct authority of the municipal government. For more on this, see Gar-on Yeh and Wu, (1999) and 
Wu, Xu and Gar-On Yeh (2007) among others. 
26 Kohler and Yang note that total urban residential and commercial building stock has four folded 
between 1995-2005 and now was estimated to be around 20 billion m2 in 2005 (Yang and Kohler 
2008). 
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as in Shanghai, which not only endorses the reorganisation and reproduction of space but 
has made it its own. 
 
Figure 9: View of the Shanghai Bund. 
The development of Shanghai mirrors and actively encourages the country’s rupture from 
old productions of space and actively promotes the new urban identity. The relocation of 
millions of urban residents to (often) remote suburbs, the demolition of entire traditional 
residential quarters and the subsequent construction of skyscraper horizons are in that 
understanding testimonial and constitutive to one overarching objective: the making of a new 
Chinese city. 
The question that globalisation theorists raise is inevitable that of the singularity and 
authenticity of the word “Chinese” in this new city. How much has remained “local” with the 
incorporation (figure 10) of “foreign” or even supposedly “global” forms? A good example to 
illustrate this question is that of the “One City, Nine Towns” (OCNT) project in the suburban 
belt of Shanghai. The OCNT constructions that supposedly represent memories of historical 
Dutch, Spanish, English (etc) architectures bear no contextual relevance to China, or to 
Shanghai for that matter, and although their form might vaguely remind the European visitor 
of their own countries of origin, the Chinese who are not born in the context of their place 
have even more difficulties in identifying with or absorb these alien planes in a logically 
consistent manner. These places are instead reinvented, re-inscribed and fuelled with new 
meanings and histories. 
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Figure 10: The “New Netherlands Town” forms part of the Nine Town, One City project in Shanghai 
and is situated at Gaoqiao (in Shanghai’s Pudong area)27 (For more on the Nine Towns, see den 
Hartog 2010). 
Is the rationale for such reproductions of space however not similar to that of the Qing a 
couple of centuries earlier? The pastiche of the OCNT often associated with post-modernity 
could easily be found in the earlier discussed yuanming yuan gardens and the alienation 
from place similarly started already with the cartographic endeavours of the Qing state. If 
globalisation wishes to challenge the organisation of space that is the territorial nation state it 
automatically needs to address the social-spatial identity which comes with its territory. Does 
the production of a so-called global space in post 1978 China fundamentally oppose the 
sovereign identity that comes with the territory of the nation state? The unitary logic 
underpinning the production of space is instead seemingly similar to the older production of 
space that has for centuries constituted the nation state. Do thousands of MacDonald 
restaurants, a Disneyland, millions of English speakers, instantaneous information flows and 
participation in multilateral treaties really challenge the fundamental territorial unity that is the 
nation state? The strong affinity that the state has created between its citizens and its 
abstract territory (place) seems to suggest otherwise. 
The fact that modernity melts “all that was solid into air” (Berman 1983) should not deter us 
from understanding how that solidity which is China could have become so tangible. So 
tangible that we think we can differentiate between what is “China” or “Chinese” and what is 
“not China” or “not Chinese”. The production and representation of space are for that reason 
not static or independent events in the creation of place (territories, cities etc) but active and 
political entities in the way we conceive, perceive and live in space. The historicising of 
modern space in this paper has attempted to show that the presupposition that the world is 
                                                            
27 Photo taken from http://www.smithsonianmag.com/people-places/Shanghais-European-
Suburbs.html  
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flat and that space can be read from a homogenous surface is not only inadequate and 
problematic but that an understanding of what it means to “be in place” should be at the 
foreground for coming to terms with modernity and globalisation. 
CONCLUSION AND VENTURES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
In the course of this paper I have attempted to “revitalise” the political importance of space 
creation by analysing how we relate to place. The discussion of what it means to perceive, 
conceive and live space has since the onset of modernity, which I by definition understand to 
be the product of a universal understanding of space (i.e. globalisation), been halted. The 
definition and beginnings of globalisation, in other words, are argued to be the process of an 
intertwinement of ontology with a modern presentation of space. The measurable concepts 
of monotonous space and linear time have replaced the questionability and politics in and of 
place and have seriously weakened the ability to think critically of what time and space mean 
and how they constitute to place. 
The identity of Chinese cities as modern places and the effect that the organisation of the 
urban space has on being-in-place needs urgently to be addressed. The linkage between 
being in the Chinese city and being in the Chinese nation state needs to be placed outside 
the purely anthropological or economic realm to understand what connects the nation and 
urban place. This should lead us back to the very question what China is. 
This is not to argue that we should blindly accept the notion that nation states and their 
culture are “imagined communities” that are socially constructed over time. Instead we 
should analyse how our understanding of such a spatial reality has transformed into 
something so seemingly “solid”. This we can only do, I think, by analysing how space has 
been constructed historically. This paper has provided a very modest attempt to do so by 
illustrating how the knowledge of a modern presentation and production of space has since 
the Qing been employed to organise an abstract and unquestionable unity of place. 
This paper hopes to also have challenged the increasingly implicit proposition that space 
and place have in the global age become somehow irrelevant. The number of things global 
(“global village”, “global city”, “global time” etc) risks the danger of undermining the very 
spatial logic which constitutes the term. Instead of analysing notions of spatial 
“supraterritoriality” (Scholte 2002) or “time-space distanciation” (Giddens 1991) it is maybe 
more pertinent to first understand what such concepts mean, where they come from and 
how they function. If not, we risk the danger of not only falling in the trap of seeing the world 
as a picture but becoming one ourselves. 
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